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JURISDICTION
This Court does not have original appellate jurisdiction over this matter because it
is an appeal from a district court's review of a land use decision by a municipality.
(;w

Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 1132-35 & 37, 70 P.3d 47 (finding the court
of appeals does not have original jurisdiction to hear challenges to land use decisions by
local government entities). This appeal should have been filed with the Utah Supreme

~

Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-102(j), subject to transfer to this Court under Utah
Code § 78A-3-102(4). Id. This matter and all briefing to date should be transferred to

\I

the Utah Supreme Court, as provided for in Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, for the Supreme Court to determine if it will retain jurisdiction or transfer
jurisdiction to this Court. See Motion to Transfer to Utah Supreme Court, which was
filed on August 12, 2016.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Was Salt Lake City's denial of CB S's application to relocate its already
demolished billboard arbitrary, capricious or illegal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Courts presume a land use decision is valid and

determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code
§ 10-9a-801(3)(a). See also Carlsen v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Smithfield, 2012 UT
\;9

App 260,

1 4,

287 P.3d 440 (quoting Utah Code § 10-9a-801(3)(a)) ("In reviewing a

municipality's land use decision, '[t]he courts shall ... presume that a decision ... is
1.;.,

valid' and shall 'determine only whether or not the decision ... is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal."') A decision is illegal if it "violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the

~

1
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time the decision was made." Utah Code§ 10-9a-801(3)(d). See also Carlsen, 2012 UT
App 260 , 4 (quoting Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P .2d 602, 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995)) ("[d]etermination of whether such a decision 'is illegal depends on a
proper interpretation and application of the law."'). This court reviews interpretations of
relevant statutory provisions for correctness giving no deference to a lower tribunal.

2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v. Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29,, 17, 345 P.3d 675. It also reviews
interpretations of relevant ordinances for correctness, but some deference is given to the
interpretation of the ordinance advanced by the agency. Carrier v. Salt Lake County,
2004 UT 98,

~

28, 104 P.3d 1208. Thus, in determining whether the decision was illegal

because it violated state law, this Court reviews the decision for correctness.

In

determining whether the decision was illegal because it violated provisions of Salt Lake
City Code, this Court reviews the decision for correctness giving some deference to Salt
Lake City's interpretation of its own ordinance.
Administrative decisions are not arbitrary and capricious if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Carlsen, 2012 UT App. 260,

,r 4.

See also Utah Code § 10-9a-

80 l (3)( c). This Court is limited to the record before the decision making body and
reviews that evidence to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the decision. Carlsen, 2012 UT App. 260,

,r 5.

It is not the prerogative of this Court to

weigh the evidence anew. Id. Rather, this Court must simply determine, in light of the
evidence before the decision making body, whether a reasonable mind could reach the
same conclusion as that body. Id.

2
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PRESERVATION: CBS appealed the denial of its application to Salt Lake City's
appeal authority and then filed a petition with the district court claiming the decision was
arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 0001-0746.)
ISSUE:

Was Salt Lake City's approval of Comer Property's application to

relocate its billboard arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standards of review set forth above also apply to
this issue.
PRESERVATION: CBS appealed the approval of Comer Property's application
"'

to Salt Lake City's appeal authority and then filed a petition with the district court
claiming the decision was arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 0001-0746.)
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code§ 10-9a-511(3)(c), Utah Code§ 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv), Utah Code § 109a-701, Utah Code§ 10-9a-707, Salt Lake City Code§§ 21A.16.010-050, and Salt Lake
City Code § 21 A.46.160. These provisions are set forth in the addendum to this brief as
provided for in Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF CASE
To construct a billboard in Salt Lake City, a billboard company must obtain a
permit from the City. See Salt Lake City Code§ 21.46.030. This case is about the City's
decision I to grant one billboard company a permit and deny another billboard company a

1

The Utah Municipal Code contemplates review of decisions made by a "land use
authority." See e.g., Utah Code § 10-9a-703(1), Utah Code § 10-9a-704(1)-(2), Utah
Code§ 10-9a-705, Utah Code§ 10-9a-707(1), (3) & (4), Utah Code§ 10-9a-801(1). In
Salt Lake City, the "land use authority" may be the planning commission, the historic
3
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permit.

Specifically, Outfront Media, LLC, fka CBS Outdoor ("CBS") filed an

application requesting a permit__!5Wtllow relocation of an al~~-~dy_~~~oli~~~
from 726 West South Temple to 738 West South Temple. (R. 0746, SLCC 000018-22;
SLCC 001473.)

Comer Property, LLC ("Comer Property") filed an application for

permits to allow relocation of a billboard from 280 West 500 South to 726 West South
Temple. (R. 0746, SLCC 001474-1526.) Salt Lake City's zoning ordinance precludes
the City from issuing permits for relocation of either billboard. See Salt Lake City Code

§ 2 lA.46.160. 2 However, a provision of the Utah State Code allows (but does not
require) a municipality to waive its zoning ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard
that would otherwise be prohibited by a municipality's zoning ordinance. See Utah Code
..
-------. _______________ ---- - -- --- ---·
10-9a-511(3)(c)(i).
Accordingly, CBS and Corner Property filed applications

---------~----§

-

---------------~---

,.

requesting permits under that provision of the Utah State Code. (R. 0746, SLCC 001473,
SLCC 001474-1526.)
'-

The City could not grant both applications because another provision of the Utah
State Code sets forth minimum spacing requirements for billboards that face a freeway.

See Utah Code § 72-7-505(3).

CBS and Comer Property proposed relocation of

billboards to front I-15 and the proposed locations placed the billboards well within that
minimum spacing requirement. The Mayor elected to waive the provisions of Salt Lake
- ~---------------

landmark comm1ss1on, the zoning administrator, or another member of the City's
administration, depending on the land use decision at issue. In this case the "land use
authority" was Mayor Becker and the Becker administration. Hereinafter, the term
"City's decision" will refer to that body and the decision made by that body.
2
A copy of Salt Lake City Code § 2 IA.46.160 is included in the Addendum
hereto.

4
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City's zoning ordinance with respect to Corner Property's application and approved that
- - - · ----- - • - -

-

-

-

------·----------

----------------------

application and denied CBS's application. (R. 0746, SLCC 001542 SLCC 001544.) This
decision was made because the Becker administration had a long standing goal of

~

reducing the number of billboards in Salt Lake City and retiring billboards when the
opportunity arose.

-------

(R. 0746, SLCC 01538,

~

2; R. 472-74 (citing R. 0746, SLCC

001528-40, 1568-70, 1572-77, 1579-87, 1589-1622).)

Granting Comer Property's

application and denying CBS's application furthered this well-established goal because it
reduced the total number of billboards in the City by one and removed a billboard from
~

ti500 South, a critical "gateway" into the City. (R.0746, SLCC 01539, ~~ 6-7; R. 0746,
SLCC 002234 (lines 1070-1150).) Approving CBS's application and denying Corner
Property's application would not achieve that result -

the total number of billboards in /,
·
1
cCJJ--~ c;- B.s ~''-tJ-),
Salt Lake City would remain the same. See infra § III, B. L
~,s:>--::J_) _,d, _rJ 'f?Vy-~ ,:=-, ".:'
'IJ
C .JJ✓
l--/1
,--- ""1
J
v< \, , .r~..>.>1.Cj
CBS appealed that decision to the City's appeal authority - a hearing officer .,, ( ., , /

ge__
6J.

1

J

,./

claiming the City's decisions violated provisions of the Utah Code. (R. 0746, SLCC
000203-000216.)

The City took the position that the hearing officer did not have

jurisdiction to determine issues of state law and, thus, could not consider CBS's
arguments that the City's decision violated state law. (R. 0746, SLCC 001404-1406;
SLCC 002259-002260 (lines 494-517).) The hearing officer disagreed and issued an
opinion affinning the City's decisions, which set forth the hearing officer's interpretation
of provisions of the Utah Code and state law. (R. 0746, SLCC 001893-1903.) CBS then
¼>

filed a petition for judicial review with the district court, pursuant to Utah Code § 10-9a80 l, claiming the City's decisions were arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 0001-8.)

5
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,
_i

The district court rejected CBS's arguments that the City's decisions were illegal because
they violated provisions of the Utah and Salt Lake City codes, finding the provisions
CBS relied on were inapplicable or disagreeing with CBS's int~rpretation of those
provisions. (R. 0550-68.) The district court also considered CBS's arguments that the
I

decisions were arbitrary and capricious and found that they were not because there was
substantial evidence in tlie record to support the City's decisions. (R. 0550-68.) CBS
brings this appeal seeking a determination from this Court that the City's decisions were
arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Salt Lake City's Billboard Ordinance and the Billboard Banking System.
r
Section 21 A.46.160 of the Salt Lake City Code (the "Billboard Ordinance")3

regulates the construction and demolition of billboards in Salt Lake City limits. The
Billboard Ordinance states its. purpose is to "limit the maximum number of billboards in
I

Salt Lake City to no greater than the current number." Salt Lake City Code/

§ 2 IA.46. l 60(A). It further states that its purpose is to provide "reasonable processes
/
and methods for the replacement or relocation of existing non-conforming billboards to
areas of the city where they will have less negative impact on the goals and polices of the
city which promote the enhancement of the city's gateways, views, vistas and related
urban design elements of the city's master plans." Salt Lake City Code§ 21A.46.160(A).
The "reasonable processes and methods" referenced is the "billboard banking" system

3

See supra n.2.

6
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that is established by the Billboard Ordinance.

See generally Salt Lake City Code

§ 2 lA.46.160.
Under the billboard banking system, if a billboard owner voluntarily demolishes a
~

>billboard, the billboard owner may "bank" credits for that billboard in the billboard bank
and use those credits to construct a new billboard in certain designated areas of the City
where billboards are a permitted use. Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.46. l 60(E)-(I). The
Billboard Ordinance limits construction of new billboards to construction under this
system. Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(J). It also precludes construction of a new
billboard within 600 feet of a road that is defined by the Billboard Ordinance as a
"gateway." Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(N). 1-15 is defined by the Billboard
Ordinance as a "gateway." Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(B)(3). The Billboard
Ordinance requires a billboard company to obtain a pennit from the City to either
demolish a billboard or to construct a new billboard.

Salt Lake City Code §

21A.46.160(D) & (L).
B.

CBS's First Application to Relocate its Billboard and the Demolition of its
Billboard.
In October 2014, CBS owned a billboard that was located at approximately 726

West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 0746, SLCC 001438-42.) The billboard
(.:J)

was located on land owned by Comer Property. (R. 0746, SLCC 001860-70.) The lease
was set to expire on September 1, 2014. (R. 0746, SLCC 001860-70.) On October 20,
2014, CBS submitted an application to the City for a permit that would allow it to move
the billboard from 726 West South Temple to 738 West South Temple and to raise the

7
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height of the billboard from its current height of 86 feet to 116 feet. (R. 07 46, SLCC
000018-22.)

CBS submitted that application pursuant to Utah Code § 72-7-510.5

because several provisions of the Salt Lake City Code governing construction or
relocation of billboards preclude the relocation requested. (R. 0746, SLCC 000018-22.)
.

.

Shortly after filing that application t9 relocate, CBS demolished the billboard at
726 West South Temple becaus~ CBS's land lease had expired and the landowner;_
Comer Property, had provided CBS .notice to vacate the property.

(R. 0746, SLCC

001860-70; SLCC 002217 (lines 553-557}.) On December 4, 2014, the City denied
CBS's application because Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 does not allow a billboard owner to
both relocate and raise the height of a billboard. (R. 0746, SLCC 001444-52.) CBS'
attempted to appeal the decision to a City hearing officer, but the City informed CBS that
its hearing officers do not have jurisdiction to interpret issues of state law. (R. 0746,
'

/

1

SLCC 0014 70-71.) On January 2, 2015, CBS filed a petition for judicial review claiming
I

that it had the right under Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 to relocate and raise the height of the
billboard. (R. 0453, , 17 citing Outfront Media f/k/a/ CBS Outdoor v. Salt Lake City

Corp., Case No. 150900004.) At the same time CBS sought and obtained a preliminary
injunction precluding the City from processing any other application for construction of a
billboard at the 738 West South Temple location or any location within 500 feet. (R.
0453,

'il

18.)

On August 18, 2015, the court affirmed the City's denial of CBS's

application finding Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 does not give a billboard owner the right to
-

both move and raise the height of a billboard that otherwise qualifies for relocation under
that statute. (R. 0453-54,

I

'il 19.)
8
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C.

CBS's Amended Application to Relocate its 8illboard ·and Corner Property's
Application to Relocate its 500 South Billboard.
Approximately one month later, CBS modified its application to request relocation

·

of its demolished billboard under Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i).
.

(R. 0746, SLCC

'""

00·1473.\ During the same period of time, the C~y was processing an application from
'\,,

Corner Property to demplish a billboard located at 2-80 ~est 500 South and relocate that

'

billboard to 726 West South Temple, where the_ CBS ~illboard was previously located.

\iii

(R. 0746, SLCC 001474-1526.) Corner Property's application was also made pursuant to
7

Utah Code§ 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i).

D.

The City's Decisions.
Both CBS and Comer Property's applications are precluded by provisions of Salt

-

Lake City's zoning ordinance. See e.g., Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(N). Utah
Code § 10-9a-511 (3 )( c )(i) provides a municipality the discretion to waive its zoning
ordinance and approve an application to relocate a billboard where its zoning ordinance
would otherwise preclude the application. Mayor Becker considered both applications.
He could not approve both requests because a provision of the Utah State Code (which
the City cannot waive) states billboards adjacent to interstate highways may not be within
500 feet of each other. Utah Code § 72-7-505(3). The requested relocations (if granted)
would place two billboards adjacent to 1-15 well within that 500 feet restriction. (R.

v1'

0746, SLCC 01539,

\

,r,r 3-5.

See also R.0746, SLCC 001473-1526.) Thus, consiste~t

with the City's goal of reducing the total number of billboards in the City, the Mayor
......_

authorized the denial of CBS's application and the approval of Corner Property's

9
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~

I
application. (R. 0746, SLCC 001538-001542.) This decision was made because it would
result in the net reduction of total billboards within the City and the removal of a
billboard from 500 South. (R. 0746, SLCC 001539, 116-7.)
On November 25, 2015, the City sent C!3S a letter stating it was denying CBS's
application pursuant to its "longstanding policy in favor of retiring and removing
billboards as the opportunity to do so arises." (R. 0746, SLCC 001542) The same day,
the City sent Comer Property notification stating the City was approving its request to
relocate its 500 South billboard to 726 West South Temple. (R. 0746, SLCC 001544.)
The City and Comer Property executed a Billboard Relocation Agreement memorializing
the terms by which Comer Property was allowed to relocate the 500 South billboard. (R.
0746, SLCC 001546-48).
E.

CBS's Appeal of the City's Decisions.
CBS pursued an appeal before the City's appeal authority -

a hearing officer -

claiming the City's denial of its application and the approval of Co~~er Property's
application were contrary to provisions of the Utah Code and arbitrary and capricious.
(R. 0746, SLCC 000203-000216.) The City argued to the hearing officer that he did not
have jurisdiction to consider CB S's arguments that the City's decisions were contrary to
provisions of state law and that he must limit his decisions to determining if the City's
decision violated the City's zoning ordinance. (R. 0746, SLCC 001404-1406; SLCC
002259.:.002260 (lines 494-517).) On January 15, 2016, the hearing officer issued an
opinion affirming the City's decisions, whiQh decision included the hearing officer's
interpretation of state law. (R. 0746, SLCC 001893-1903.) CBS appealed that decision
10
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\.

.

to the district court. (R. 550-568.) The district court found the City's hearing officer did

r:,,\.

, not have jurisdiction to decide issues of state law, gave no deference to the hearing
"-

.

officer's· ruling on those issues, and found the City's decisions were not arbitrary,
•

<.

A._

-

papri~ious, or illegal. (R. 550-568.) CBS ~pe~ls that decision to this Court.

(:d)

'/

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
CBS asks this Court to review two City decisions: (1) the Mayor's decision to

deny CBS's section 511 application to relocate its demolished 726 West South Temple
billboard, and (2) the Mayor's decision to approve Comer Property's section 511
application to relocate its 500 South billboard. The decisions are not arbitrary, capricious

(.ti)

or illegal and should be upheld.
With respect to the first City decision, the denial of CBS's application was not
illegal.

The Mayor, as the City's chief administrator, has authority· to make

administrative decisions on behalf of the City and the grant or denial of an application for
billboard permits maee under section 511 of the Utah Munic.ipal Code, Utah Code § 109a-5 l 1, is an administrative decision. ·
CBS contends the City Council 1'5 required to approve the Mayor's decision

-

because a provision of the Eminent Domain Statute, Utah Code § 78B-6-501 et. seq.,
requires the City Council to approve the exercise of th~ powers of eminent domain
conferred by that statute.

That provision does not apply because the City is not

exercising a power of eminent domain under the Eminent Domain Statute and the
.

Vi

.

prgyisions of that statute do not apply to the denial of an application for a billboard
permit made pursuant to section 511 of the Utah Municipal Code.
11
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Specifically, sections 511 and 513 are contained in the Uta~ Municipal Code and
set forth the statutory scheme that governs the applications at issue in this case. Those
\

,

provisions do _not state that the statutory scheme created by sections 511 and 513
incorporate the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation process set forth in ~that
statute. .Legislative history also demonstrates that it was not the intent of the legislature
to incorporate the Eminent D_omain Statute and the condemnation process set forth in that
statute into the section 511 statutory scheme.

Reading sections 511 and 513 as

incorporating the requirements of the Eminent Domain Statute and its condemnation
process is also absurd because it would impose the process in a regulatory taking action
where the process is completely inapplicable and difficult, if not impossible, to complete.
It would also enable billboard companies to prevent a municipality from denying a
section 511 application, an absurd result where the plain language of the statute gives
municipalities that choice.
The Court should also reject CBS's alternative argument that the City's denial of
its application is illegal because section 21A.46.160CC of the Salt Lake City Code
precludes the City from denying applications to relocate billboards where just
compensation is owed for the denial.

Interpreting section 21A.46. l 60CC as CBS

suggests reads section 21A.46. l 60CC in conflict with the plain language of section 511.
Where state and city code conflict, state code prevails. Moreover, the plain language and
legislative history of section 21A.46.160CC do not support CBS's interpretation of that
provision and the City has never interpreted that provision as precluding the City from
making such denials.
12
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Likewise, the denial of CBS 's application is not arbitrary and capricious because it
furthered the City's goal of reducing the total number of billboards in the Salt Lake City
limits. CB S's claim that the City_..has no policy, goal or objective of reducing billboards
'

/

in the City limits lacks merit because the record is replete with examples of that goal of
the Becker administration
and a policy, objective or goal of 'an administration does not
.
\
need to be passed by the City Council to be valid, as CBS contenos.
With respect to the second City decision, the approval of Comer Property's
application is not illegal because section 511 allows the City to waive its ordinances to
~

permit that relocation. Likewise, the decision is not arbitrary__and capricious because
I

denying CBS's application and approving Comer Property's application furthered the
City's goal of reducing the total number of billboards in the City limits and removed a
billboarg from 500 South, a critical gateway to the City.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE DECISIONS SUBJECT TO
THAT REVIEW.
A.

The Applicable Standard of Review.

When reviewing administrative decisions a court must "presume that a decision ..
. made under the authority of [Title 10, Chapter 9a] is valid; and ... determine only
whether or not the decision ... is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code § 10-9a801(3)(a)(i)-(ii). A decision is illegal if "the decision ... violates a law, statute, or
I

ordinance in effect atthe time the decision was made .... " Utah Code § 10-9a-801 (3 )( d).
A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision- is not supported by substantial

'
13
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evidence in the record. Carlsen v. Ed. of Adjustment of City of Smithfield, 2012 UT App
, 260, ,r 4, 287 P.3d 440.
B.

The Decisions Subject to Review by this Court.

CBS incorrectly identifies the hearing officer's ruling, not the Mayor's decisions,
as· the administrative decision at issue and the, subject of 1 review in this case. '
.

Municipalities are charged by statute with the responsibility of establishing an appeal
authority to "hear and decide ... appeals from decisions applying, the [municipality's]
land use ordinances." Utah Code § 10-9a-701(1)(b). In the vast majority of cases, an
appeal authority is charged with nothing more than determining whether the land use
authority's decision violates a law, statute or ordinance or was not supported by
substantial evidence. 4 As such, the appeal authority performs the same review as a
district court in a petition for judicial review or an appellate court on an appeal from that
decision and its ruling is no more the administrative decision at issue than the ruling of
the district court or a ruling of this Court. In some circumstances an appeal authority
may f.ctually hear testimony, weigh evidence, and is charged with remaking the

4

See e.g., Utah Code § 10-9a-701(3)(a)(i)-(ii) (stating an appeal authority acts in
a "quasi-judicial manner" and "serve[s] as the final arbiter of issues involving the
interpretation or application of land use ordinances"); Utah Code § 10-9a-707(3)
(directing appeal authorities to "determine the correctness of a decision of the land use
authority in its interpretation and application of a land use ordinance."); Salt Lake City
Code§ 21A.16.030(E) ("[a]n appeal from a decision of the historic landmark commission
or planning commission shall be based on the record made below ... [t]he appeals
hearing officer shall uphold the decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record or it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect when the decision was
made.")

14
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administrative decision. 5 Only in those rare circumstances is the appeal authority's ruling
the administrative decision that is the subject of review.
The hearing officer's ruling is not the administrative decision at issue in this case
~

fq.r, two reasons. One, the hearing officer did not have authority to issue a ruling on the

--

issues raised in the administrative appeal.

Two, the hearing officer's review was

appellate in nature. A hearing officer's authority is specifically limited to considering a
- I11unicipality' s I application of its land use ordinance.

See Utah Cqde § 10-9a-707(4)

("/ojnly those decisions i11 which a la11d use authority has applied a la11d use ordinance
~

to a particular application, person, or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority.")
(emphasis added); Utah Code § 10-9a-703( 1) (limiting appeals to an appeal authority to
claims "that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by
the land use authority in the administration or interpretation of the land use
ordinance."); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.16.0 IO ("'the appeals hearing officer shall hear

and decide appeals alleging an error in any administrative decision made by the zoning
administrator or the administrative hearing officer in the administration or enforcement
of this title, as well as administrative decisions of the historic landmark commission; and

the planning commission.") (emphasis added). CBS' s administrative appeal asked the
hearing officer to interpret the language of Utah Code § 10-9a-51 I (3 )( c) and find the
5

See e.g., Utah Code § I 0-9a-707( 1)-(2) (stating that factual matters are reviewed
under the standard set by municipal ordinance and where no standard is set the appeal
authority reviews the matter de novo ); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.46.030(E)( 1) ("[t]he
standard of review for an appeal, other than as provided in subsection E2 of this section,
shall be de novo. The appeals hearing officer shall review the matter appealed anew,
based upon applicable procedures and standards for appr_oval, and shall give no deference
to the decision below.")

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mayor's decisions wer~ not permitted by that and other provisions of the Utah Code. As
the City argued to the hearing officer, a hearing officer is not an Article III judge and a
-

-~

district court, not a City hearing officer, must make the determinations CBS requested in,
its administrative appeal.

6

(R. 0746, SLCC 001404-1406; SLCC 002259-002260 (lines

494-517).) Despite the City's arguments, the hearing officer issued a ruling approving
the Mayor's decisions and setting forth his interpretation of section 511 and the
applicability of the Eminent Domain Statute to that provision. 7 (R. 0746, SLCC 0018931903.)
Second,\. the hearing officer's review although designated as de novo was
appropriately appellate in nature.
second time."

8

De novo review literally means "anew, afresh, a

Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1981) (internal quotations
r

omitted). "De novo" may mean a complete retrial upon new evidence or a trial upon the
record made before the lower tribunal. Id. at 416. The meaning of "~e novo" is "dic~ated
by the wording and context of the statute in which it appears and by the nature of the
administrative body, decision and procedure being reviewed.~ Id. at 416-17. A de novo
review of a decision made pursuant to statutory authority granting the decision-maker
/

6

Notably, the issues CBS asked the hearing officer to rule on are also issues of
first impression under Utah law.
7
A hearing officer has authority to interpret municipal land use ordinances, but
the hearing officer did not reach a conclusion on the meaning of section 21A.46.160(CC)
of the Salt Lake City Code because the hearing officer determined that state law
"trumped" City ordinance and the state law permitted the City to waive that ordinance.
(R. 0746, SLCC 001896-98.)
8
The hearing officer found he was required to conduct a de novo review in this
case because the decision was not an appeal from a decision of the historic landmark ,
commission or the planning commission. (R. 01984-95.) See also Salt Lake City Code §
21A.16.030(E), included in the Addendum.
16
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discretion requtres the court to determine if the statute provided the decision maker
I

,authority to make the decision and whether the decision made exceeds the bounds of
•

I

reasonableness. See e.g., Hogs R Us v. Town o(Fairfield, 2009 UT 21,207 P.3d 1221.

(
For example, in Hogs R Us, 2009 UT 21, ,I,I 2-6, the Utah Supreme Court was
charged with determining whether the law required the Town of Fairfield to maintain a
road the plaintiffs used to access their land under a de nova standard of review.
Recognizing it is not the role of a court to substitute its decision for that of an elected
official where a statute confers authority for the decision on the electeq official, the
;,;;jJ

court's de no.vo _revie\V consisted of a determination that the applicable statute gave the
,

town complete discretion to decide how to improve roads and the common faw did not
otherwise impose a duty to maintain roads. Id.,

ii~

15-23.

To the extent the hearing officer had any authority to review the Mayor's
decisions in thi~ case he appropriately limited his de novo review to a determination of
r

~he~~~r

the statute afforded the Mayor discretion to make the decisions and whether the

decisions exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.

9

9

As such, the hearing officer's ruling

CBS argued the hearing officer's de novo review should extend to the hearing
officer stepping into the shoes of the Mayor and substituting his decision for that of the
Mayor. The hearing officer initially ruled that he believed his de novo review extended
to considering matters of City policy and substituting his decision for that of the Mayor,
if he felt it was appropriate. (R. 0746, SLCC 002225 (lines 793-813); SLCC 001398
('The review is not limited to the facts and law but also to policy considerations which
fall within the discretion of the City to consider in making the original decisions.").) The
City assisted the hearing officer in understanding that his role, as a quasi-judicial officer,
was to consider whether the decisions made were permitted by law, not to substitute his
decision for that of the Mayor where the decision involves pure policy considerations.
(R. 0746, SLCC 001405-06.) In his final decision, the hearing officer agreed witft the
City's position and appropriately limited his de novo review to a determination of
·
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1

is appellate in nature and is essentially the same in scope as the review conducted by the
district court and the review that will be conducted by this Court.

(R. 07 46, SLCC

01894-95.) The Mayor's decisions, not the hearing officer's review of those decisions,
are the administrative decisions subject to review in this appeal.

II.

THE CITY'S DENIAL OF CBS'S APPLICATION TO RELOCATE A
DEMOLISHED BILLBOARD WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR
ILLEGAL.
The City's denial of CBS's section 511 application requesting the City waive its

zoning ordinance and allow CBS to relocate its demolished billboard was not arbitrary,
capricious or illegal because ( 1) the Mayor can make a decision to deny a section 511
application; (2) section 21 A.46.160(CC) of the Salt Lake City Code does not prevent the
Mayor from making that decision, and (3) the decision is supported by substantial
/

evidence.
A.

The Mayor can make a Decision to Deny a Section 511 Application.

. 1.

Waiving or not Waiving an Ordinance is an Administrative
Decision.

Granting or denying an application brought under section 511 is an administrative
decision that the Mayor has authority to make. Section 511 (3 )( c)(i) allows a municipality
to waive (or not waive) its zoning ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard that is
o~herwise prohibited. Utah Code § 10-9a-51 l (3)(c)(i). The subsection sets forth no
factors or guidelines stating any circumstance under which a municipality must waive its

whether the statute afforded the Mayor authority to make the decisions and whether the
decisions exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. (R. 0746, SLCC 001894-95.)

18
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/

;ordinance, but rather contemplates a negotiation between the parties and an agreement to
a ':mutually acceptable location."

Id.

Thus, the decision to waive ( or not waive)

_ ordinances and permit relocation of billboards is left to the discretion of the municipality.
The Mayor, as Salt Lake City's chief administrative officer, has the authority to
, exercise that discretion on behalf of the City. It is well established that in a councilmayor form of government the council is responsible for the passage of la~vs and the
mayor, and the administration are responsible for the enf<?rcement of those laws. Scherbel

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) (quoting Martindale v. Anderson,
581 P .2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978)

'@

C" [l]egislative power, as distinguished from executive

power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce th~m or appoint the agents
charged with the duty to make such enforcement. The latter are executive functions."').
A decision to waive ( or not waive) ordinances falls clearly within the powers afforded the

administration because it is a decision to '"enforce" or not to "enforce" provisions of
zoning ordinances. A decision under section 51 I falls squarely within the realm of the
executive branch and it was appropriate for the Mayor to make the decision that the City
was _!10t going to waive its ordinances and deny CBS 's request to relocate its already
demolished billboard.

2.

Approval of the City Council is not Required when a Municipality
Denies a Section 511 Application.

CBS claims the City's denial of its application is illegal because the City Council
'@

"

must approve that denial. CB S's argument relies on a provision of the Eminent Domain
Statute~ Utah Code § 78B-6-50 I et. seq., that requires approval from the City Council

19
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\

when the City exercises the powers of eminent domain conferred by that statute. That '
provision does not apply because the City is not exe~cising a power of eminent domain
,,. under that. statute and the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute do no~ apply to
decisions to deny applications for billboard pennits made pursuant to section 511.
i.

Section 511 and section 513 do not incorporate the Eminent
Domain Statute and its condemnation process.

Sections 511 and 513 are contained in the Utah Municipal Code and set forth the ·
statutory scheme that· governs .the application at issue in this case. They do not state that
the scheme incorporates the condemnation process set forth in the Eminent Domain
Statute .. · See Utah Code §§ 10-9a-511 & 513. "When interpreting a statute, [a court
should] look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms." Anadarko Petroleum
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2015 UT 25,

~

11, 345 P.3d 648. HWhen language is

clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
construction." Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (quoting Salt
Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)

(quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P. 377, 3 80 (1921 )). Likewise, "'where two statutes
t~eat the same subject matter, and one statute is general while the other is specific, the
. spedfic provision controls." Floyd v. W. Surgical Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Sections 511 and 513 set forth the statutory scheme that governs the application at
issue in this case. Section 511 (3 )( c)(i) states a municipality "may" waive its zoning
ordinance to "permit a billboard owner to relocate the billboard within the municipality's

20
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1

1
·

boundaries to a location that is mutually acceptable to the municipality and the billboard
owner.". Utah
Code §10-9a-51 l (3)(c)(i). Secti-on 511(3)(c)(ii) states that if the parties
.
,

-

•

-

I

cannot ·reach a mutually agreeable location within ninety days of hie subm'is~on of the .
'\.'

.

application the provisions of section 513(2)(a)(iv) apply.

,-

':'

-

Utah Code. § 10-9a-

,_

511(3)(c)(ii) . . section 513(2)(a)(iv)_states that a municipality is "considered to have
-ifiitiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent domain if the municipality
prevents a billboard owner from . . . relocating a billboard into any commercial,
industrial, or manufacturing zone ... ~- if the requested relocation is within one mile of the
vi

original location and meets other distance· requirements.

Utah _Code § 10-9a-

5 l 3(2)( a)(iv ). Section 513(2)(d) sets forth the 'just compensation" that is owed when a
municipality is '"considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard." Utah Code
§ 10-9a-513(2)( d).

This scheme essentially authorizes a municipality to waive its

ordinances to allow relocation of a billboard and finds that in some circumstances just
compensation is owed if a municipality declines to waive its ordinance and allow
relocation.
No provision of section 511 or section 51} references the general Eminent Domain·
Statute

01:

states that the provisions of that statute apply when a City denies a section 5 ll
\

application, a point CBS concedes. (Appellant Br. 20 & 23 .) Courts must "seek to give
effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all orriissipns to be purposeful."
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P 's~ip, 2011 UT 50,

,r

14, 267 P.3d 863.

The

legislature had the means to incorporate the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute by
reference, if that was its intent. Its failure to do so must be understood as purposeful.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 21
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'·

CBS's assertion that incorporation of the Eminent Domain Statute should be assumed
· I.J

because sections 511 and 513 do not specifically exclude that statute is contrary to this
well established principle.
\ .

I

ii.
\

I

Legislative history demonstrates sections 511 and S 13 do not
incorporate the Eminent · Domain Statute and it.r' ~
condemnation process.

Legislative h}story also demonstrates that it was not the intent of the legislature to
,

"\

-

-

.

incorporate the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation process
set forth in that statute into the statutory scheme set forth in sections 511 and . 513.
"When examining a statute, [courts] look first to its plain language as the best indicator of
the legislature's intenJ and purpose in passing the statute."

Wilson v. Valley Mental

Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998). "[I]f that language is ambiguous [courts] turn to
a consideration of legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Id.
CBS claims that the language of section 513 shows the legislature intended section
513 to incorporate the provisions of the Eminent D9mait?- Statute because it states "[a]
municipality is considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by
eminent domain" if the municipality. preveqts a billboard owner from relocating a
billboard within parameters defined by that section. (Appellant Br. 16~ 17 & 19-20 ( citing
Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)(a).)

But legislative history demonstrates the opposite.

In

20 I 0, a bill was proposed to modify the language of section 513 to require a municipality
to "initiate eminent domain proceedings in the district court" if it prevented the
modifications or a relocation within the parameters identified in section 513. (R. 0209-

22
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224, H.B. 180, 2010 Leg., Gen Sess. (Utah 2010).) The bill did not pass. By not passing
this bill, the legislature made clear the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute and the

,'"

-

.

-

-

\

process set
forth in that statute did not' apply to the process of paying just compensationi
I
.

I

+

•

I

•

,

for t~e denial of a billbo~rd -·felocation Pyrmit, even if the denial gives rise to an
:

'

l,

.,

..

'

·'

obligation to pay just corripensation.
_,,.,.,

,_,,

iii.

Sections 511 and 513 do not incorporate the Eminent
Domain
Statute and its condemnation process because the
'
.
stqtutes are not in pari materia.
\

.- j
,

,

r

'

The Court rllay reject CBS's claim that sections 511 and 513 should be read as
incorporating the terms of the Eminent Domain Statute for the additional reason that the
statutes are not in pari materia. Statutes are only construed together when they are
~

pari materia. J.J. W. v. State, Div. of Child & Family Servs., 2001 UT App 271,

in

,r,r 21-23,

33 P.3d 59 (stating the "[s]tatute[s] are not in pari materia and we will not construe them
together.) Statutes are in pari materia _'\v.hen they relate to the same person or thing, to
-the same class of persons or" things, or have the same purpose or object." Id., ,r 22
.

-

,/

-

'

/

(quoting Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985)).
.

,,,_

'

-

In JJ W the State argued, simHar to the argument made by CBS in this case, that
the Juvenile Expungement Statute should be interpreted the same as the Criminal
Expungement Statute and that the definition of "expungement" used in the Criminal
Expungement Statute should also apply to the Juvenile Expungement Statute. Id.,

,r 21.

The court declined to impute the definition of one statute to the other because the statutes
were not in pari materia. Id.,

,r 23.

In reaching the conclusion that the statutes were not

23
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"'-

.

\

'

\'

in pari materia the court found the statutes did not relate to the same p~rson or class of,,,

\

persons because one statute "deals with records generated in connection with juvenile
delinquency proceedings" whereas, the other statute "deals with adult criminal records."

Id. It also {ound that the statutes did not have the same purpose hecause the Juvenile
Expungement Statute is broader than the Criminal Expungement Statute, permitting
expungement of a wider category of documents. Id.
This case presents a much clearer example of statutes'111.at are not in pari materia.
The statutory scheme established by sections 511 and 513 do not relate to the same
person or class of persons and do not have the same purpose as the Eminent Domain
Statute. Section 511 sets forth a process for a municipality and a billboard owner to
attempt to agree on relocation of a billboard and section 513 imposes an obligation to pay
just compensation in some circumstances, if agreement is not reached. The Eminent
Domain Statute sets forth the circumstances under which a government entity may take
title to property and use that property for a public use and sets forth the process a
government entity must follow when it exercises that power of eminent domain. Sections
511 and 513 and the Eminent Domain Statute are not in pari materia and the Court
should not apply the process contained in the Eminent Domain Statute to sections 511
and 513.
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iv.

Section 511 and 513 tw-nfJJ incorporate the Eminent Domain
'7
Statute and its condemnation process 'because it is absurd to
impose that process in a regulatory taking action.

Reading sections 511 and 513 as incorporating the requirements of the Eminent
\

Domain Statute and its condemnation process is also absurd because sections 511 and
513 set forth a circumstance in which a regulatory taking occurs. See £neon Utah, LLC

v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,
Z. C., 2007 UT 54,

~

,r 73, 210 P.3d 263, 276 (quoting State ex rel.

15, n.5, 165 P .3d 1206 ("'[ when] statutory language plausibly

presents the court with t\vo alternative readings,"' a court should adopt "the reading that
avoids absurd results.")). The statutory scheme established by sections 511 and 513 is a
$.l_atutory determination that a regulatory taking occurs, in some circumstances, when a
municipality declines to waive its ordinance and permit relocation of a billboard.

\dU

A

\
regulatory taking occurs at common law when the denial of an application for a permit or
the passage of an ordinance deprives a property owner of "all reasonable [or
economically viable] uses of his land." Tolman v. Logan City, 2007 UT App 260,

,r

11,

167 P.3d 489 (quoting Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991).) If a
4-@

property owner can make that showing the owner may receive just compensation for the
./

taking. See e.g., Nat'! Parks & Conservation Ass 'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,
925 (Utah 1993) (overruled on other grounds) ("'The state . . . need compensate a
landowner only if the regulation deprives him or her of all economically viable use of the
land .... ").
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Section 513 removes the requirement that a billboard owner show a taking of all
®

economically viable use of a billboard to establish a regulatory taking when a City
declines to waive its ordinances and permit relocation of a billboard under section 511.
Instead, to establish a taking the billboard owner must show its application satisfies the
\I

circumstances listed i~ section\ 513 that give, rise to an obligation to pay just
compensation. Like any other decision t~at g~ves rise to a claim that a regulatory taking

•

has occurred, the ~1]nent Domain Statute does not apply and a municipality is not ~ '
required to follow the condemnation process set forth in that statute, including obtaining

--approval of the City Council before making a decision to deny a permit.
The provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute are also wholly inapplicable to a
regulatory taking type action. For example, section 504 of the general Eminent Domain
Statute provides a municipality must show that the property taken "is to be applied [to] a
use authorized by law," the taking is "necessary for the use," and the "construction and
use of all property sought to be condemned will commence within a reasonable time ...
after the initiation of proceedings." Utah Code § 7 8B-6-504( a)-( c ). This requirement. is
completely inapplicable to the denial of an application to relocate a billboard under
section 511 of the Utah Municipal Code because a municipality does not take ow_nership
j
I

of the billboard and it is not commencing any "construction" or "public use" of any
property.
Section 504 also requires written notice be provided to the property owner and that
the prop~rty owner be provided an opportunity to be heard before a final vote is taken by
the political subdivision to take the property at issue. Utah Code§ 78B-6-504(2)(b)-(d) .
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I

®

It is completely illogical to require a municipality to provide written notice that it is going
to deny an application to relocate before doing so. Likewise, it makes no sense to require
a municipality to provide a billboard owner notice and a right_ to be heard before denying
~

an application to relocate where the billboard owner is clearly on notice of the process
,
'

I

i

because it filed an application to relocate and initiated Jhe, relocation process. It is absurd
.

.

J

~

\

to~ impose the requirement of the Eminent Domain Statute on this regulatory taking action
and the Court should decline to do so.

v.

Section 511 and 513 do not inc01porate the Eminent Domain
Statute and its condemnation process because it would allow
a billboard owner to prevent a municipality from denying a
section 511 application.

Imposing the requirement of the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation
process set forth in that statute gives rise to the additional absurd result that a billboard
owner can prevent a municipality from ever deny__ing an application to relocate under
section 511, despite the fact the statute provides municipalities that choice.

The

con~·emnation_ l??ce~s set forth in the Eminent Domain Statute and the· Utah Relocation
Assistance ~ct requires a condemning party to prepare an appraisal and negotiate in good
,

/

-

I

faith with the propetty owner- for the purchase of the property before condemning the
property. See Utah Code § 78B-6-504(2)(b) (stating "[p]roperty may not be taken by a
political subdivision of the state unless the governing body of the political subdivision
approves the taking"); Utah Code § 78B-6-505(1 )(a) (stating that before a political
subdivision takes a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, the
"governing body ... make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for
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the purchase of the property."); Utah Code"§ 57-12-13(2) (requiring "[r]eal property shall
\

I

be appraised 4Jefore the initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his designated
represent~tive shall be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his
inspection of the property."); Utah Code § 57-12-13(3) (stating with respect to the
amount offered in negotiations that "[i]n no event shall such amount be less than the
lowest approved appraisal of the fair market value of the property."). CBS argues these
provisions also apply to the denial of a section 511 application. (Appellant Br. 23, n. l .)
Unlike a parcel of real property, an appraiser cannot value a billboard based on its
size, geographic setting and comparable properties. Rather, Utah statute directs that a
billboard is valued like a business, based on the actual annual revenue generated by the
particular billboard at issue.

Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)( d)(i) ( directing that "just

compensation" for a billboard is calculated using "a fair market capitalization rate, based
on actual annual revenue, less any annual rent expense"). If a billboard owner refuses to
provide records showing the revenue generated by the billboard at issue, as billboard
companies generally do when filing an application to relocate with the City, a
municipality cannot prepare an appraisal and value the billboard as directed by Utah

-

Code § 10-9a-513(2)( d)(i) before denying an application to relocate.

This issue 1s

extensively briefed in a matter currently pending before this Court. 10
/

10

In that case, Reagan Outdoor Advertising ("Reagan") filed an application to
relocate a billboard under a different provision of the Utah .State Code. See Appellant
Br., 5-6 (§ A Statement of Facts) Salt Lake City v. ROA General Inc. dba Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Appellate No. 2015-0608-CA. At the time the appl_ication was
filed, the land lease was set to expire and the landowner had represented it would not
renew the lease: Id., 7-8 (§ D Statement of Facts). The City denied the application,
28
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. Ci;

Notably, CBS argued to the hearing officer and to the district court that the City's
decision was illegal because the Eminent Domain Statute and condemnation process
requires the City to file a Complaint in condemnation. CBS does not expressly raise Jhat
~

argument in this briefing, perhaps because it makes the absurdities of imposing the
requirements of the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation process so apparent.
vi.

Section 512 does not show sections 511 and 513 incorporate
the Eminent Domain Statute and the Condemnation Process.

The Court may also reject CBS's argument that the Eminent Domain Statute
\

applies because section 512 o( the Municipal Code provides that "a municipality may
only require termination of a billboard ... by (a) gift; (b) purchase; (c) agreement; (d)
exchange; or (e) eminent domain." Utah Code § 10-9a-512. The City did not require

\

}\l}J_ich came with a statutory obligation to pay just compensation. Id. 7-8 (§ D Statement
of Facts). The City attempted to obtain financial inforrrultion from Reagan to prepare an
appraisal and pay the just compensation owed. Id. 6-7 (§ B Statement of Facts). Reagan
refused to provide the infonnation, insisting the City was required to initiate formal
condemnation proceedings and file a Complaint in condemnation or grant the application
to relocate. Id. 6-7 (§ B Statement of Facts). The City did not agree that this was
required, but filed the action. Id. 6-7 (§§ B-C Statement of Facts). Several years Yater an
affiliate of Reagan purchased the property on which the billboard stands and entered into
a new long term lease with. Reagan. Id. 10-11 (§ G Statement of Facts). Now that
Reagan no longer needed to relocate the billboard because of an expiring lease, it moved
the court to dismiss the action because the City had not complied with the pre-filing
_;equirements, including preparing an appraisal and entering into good faith negotiations.
with Reag~n based on that @ppraisal. Id. 12-13 (§ I Statement of Facts). The district
court dismissed the case. Id. The City appealed the decision because the City_Js not
c_eq_uired to initiate condemnation under Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, to deny an
application to relocate and it is not possible to comply vvith the requirements of the
condemnation process set forth in Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, and the Utah Relocation
Assistance Act if a billboa.!_ci mvner does not cooperate in the process. See generally
Appellant Br. & Reply Br., Salt Lake City v. ROA General Inc. dba Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, Appellate Nq. 2015-0608-CA. Oral argument is scheduled Jor September_
15,2016.
I
·
,I
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/

termination of CBS 's billboard. Rather, CBS requested the City exercise the discretion it

tb

is afforded by section 511 and waive its zoning ordinance to permit CBS

relocate its

billboard from one location to another location. The City declined. A municipality's
refusal to permit relocation of a billboard is r1ot the same as a municipality requiring the
termination of a billboard. When a request for relocation is refused a billboard is free to
remain at the existing location. 11 The fact that CBS demolished its billboard prior to
...

making its request to relocate (because the
landlord
had evicted CBS from the land) does
t1
~,
not transform CBS's request to relocate a billboard under section 511 into the City·
requiring termination of the billboard under section 512.
vii.

The City Council's role in appropriating funds does not si10w
the City Council is required to approve the Mayor's decision
to deny CBS 's application.

The City Council's role in appropriating funds does not show the City Council is
required to approve the Mayor's decision to deny CBS 's application.

A decision to

enforce or not enforce a zoning ordinance is classic executive function. See supra § II,
A. l. That function is not removed because the decision results in the expenditure of
funds.

City Council does not weigh in on every City decision that results in the

expenditure of funds. Rather, City Council appropriates funds and adopts a budget. See
generally Utah Code§ 10-9a-203. The executive branch manages the funds appropriated

and makes decisions based on the funds appropriated or what Council will allocate in a
11

Sections 511 and 513 do not contemplate a municipality demolishing and
taking possession of the billboard the billboard owner wishes to relocate. Utah Code §§
10-9a-511 & 513. Thus, it is the billboard owner's option to either remain at the existing
location or elect to demolish its billboard and receive just compensation for the
municipality's refusal to waive ordinances and permit relocation.
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requested budget amendment. See generally Utah Code § 10-9a-202. Notably, there is
no evidence in the record to show that funds were not appropriated or available to pay
any' amount that may become due as a result of the City's denial of CBS 's application.
~

The Mayor had authority to deny CB S's ap~lication without the approval of Council.
\

In addition, denying a section 511 application does not necessarily result in an
)

obligation to pay funds. Whether the billb_??rd fits the narrmv categories of billboards for
~'hich compensation is owed may be th,e s1ject of dispute and hotly contested.

12

Likewise, even if a billboard owner can show entitlement to payment of just
@

compensation under the statute, the owner may choose to keep its billboard at its current
location and not. enforce that right or elect to bank billboard credits in lieu of just
compensation. 13

See supra 6-7, § A, Statement of Facts.

It is impractical and

inconsistent with the roles of the City's branches of government, which place the
responsibility of enforcing ordinances, approving permits, and managing litigation
squarely in the realm of the administration, to require the City Council to pass on every
permit request because there is a possibility that a municipally may incur_ an obligation to
pay some as yet unknown amount at some unknown time in the future.

12

For example, in this case CBS has brought to the attention of the City through
its appeals of this matter that its novv demolished billboard stood at a height of 86 feet,
rather than the permitted 85 feet, which may absolve the City of any obligation to pay
just compensation for denying its section 511 application. See Utah Code § 10-9a5 l 3(3 )(a)-( d) and 513(2)(c).
13 S
ee supra n.11.
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B.

Section 21A.46.160(CC) does not Preclude the Denial of CBS's
Application.

CBS claims, in the alternative, that the denial of its application is illegal because
section 21A.46.160(CC) of the Salt Lake City Code precludes the City from denying its
application. "It is well established that, where a city ordinance is in conflict with a state
statute, the ordinance is invalid at its inception.'' Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29,

~

15, 116

P.3d 290,293. -See also Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671,674 (1938) ("It is our view
that the ... [state statute] makes void all ordinances, otherwise lawful, which conflict
with and constitute a barrier to the enforcement of the uniform state law.").

"In

determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether
the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice
versa." Hansen, 2005 UT 29, 115 (quoting Kusse, 93 P.2d at 674)). The plain language
of section 511 allows a municipality to waive (or not waive) provisions of its zoning
ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard.

Interpreting section 21A.46.160(CC) as

precluding the City from waiving its ordinances under section 511, unless just
compensation is owed for the denial, reads section 21A.46.160(CC) in conflict with the--...........__
plain language of section 511 that expressly permits a municipality to do that very thing.
In addition, when interpreting the meaning of an ordinance a court looks first to
\...

the plain language of the ordinance and applies the same rules of statutory construction it
applies when examining a statute. See e.g., Carrier, 2004 UT 98, i130. If the language is
,ambiguous, courts may resort to other modes of construction. Id., 1

3J.

"In so doing,

however, [courts] must keep in mind that ' [w]hen interpreting a[ n ordinance], ii is
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axiomatic that this court's primary goal 'is to give effect to the [City's] intent in light of
the purpose that the [ordinance] was meant to achie~e."'

Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,
~

P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998)).

~

Id., (quoting Biddle v.

14, 993 P.2d 875 (quoting Evans v. Utah, 963

Likewise, some deference is afforded the City's

interpretation of its ordinance. Id.,

~

28. "[I]n close cases [the agency's] interpretation

may be a determinative factor in choosing a particular interpretation over another." Id.,
31.
Section 21A.46.160(CC) of the Salt Lake City Code does not state the City must
~

grant an application to relocate a billboard, if denial will result in an obligation to pay just
compensation. It states: "Except as otherwise authorized herein, existing billboards may
not be relocated except as mandated by the requirements of Utah State law." Salt Lake
City Code § 21A.46. l 60(CC).

If the City Council intended to pass a provision that

required the granting of all applications to relocate, if denial triggered an obligation to
pay just compensation, it would have passed a provision that said that. Jt did not.
Section 21A.46.160(CC) must also be read in the context of the purpose of the
/,;c11

'lit/I

Billboard Ordinance and its placement in that ordinance.

The Billboard Ordinance

establishes a billboard bankihg system, which is the only way a billboard owner may
relocate a billboard within the Salt Lake City limits under City law. Read in that context,
it is clear the Council's intent in enacting section 21A.46.160(CC), the final provision of
the billboard ordinance, was to state that the billboard banking system was the only way a
@

billboard owner could relocate a billboard within Salt Lake City, unless a provision of
state law required otherwise.
33
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A review of the legislative history makes even clearer that this was the intent of
the legislature.

Section 21 A.46.160( CC) was passed at a time when the billboard

industry was lobbying for state bills in an attempt to reduce a City's ability to deny
applications for permits to modify or relocate billboards. 14 See e.g., Utah Code § 72-7516 (enacted 2002); R. 0746, SLCC 01716-22, S.B. 53, 2004 Leg., Gen Sess. (Utah
2001) ( expanding circumstances under which a municipality must pay just compensation
for the denial of a permit to relocate or otherwise modify a billboard).

Section

21A.46. l 60(CC) is nothing more than a statement by City Council that the City cannot be
forced to allow relocation (unless mandated by state law) and prevents billboard
companies from attempting to force the City to grant a relocation request where state law
gives the City discretion to deny those requests, as CBS is attempting to do in this case.
Finally, some deference should be afforded the City's interpretation of its own
ordinance. The City has never interpreted this provision to require the City to grant any
application to relocate when just compensation is owed for the denial. Indeed, the City
has denied prior requests for relocation that resulted in an obligation to pay just
compensation.

See e.g., Salt Lake City v. ROA General Inc. dba Reagan Outdoor

Advertising, et al., Appellate Case No. 20150608-CA. Section 21A.46.160(CC) does not
require the City to grant CB S's application and the City's denial of that application was
not illegal.

14

Section 21A.46.160(CC) was passed in 2004. (R. 0746, SLCC 01726 & 1731.)
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C.

The City's Denial of CBS's Application is Supported by Substantial
Evidence.

The City's denial of CBS's application is not arbitrary and capricious because
there is substantial evidence to show denying the application furthered the City's goal of
reducing the number of billboards within City limits.

A decision is arbitrary and

capricious if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Carlsen,
~

2012 UT App 260

ri 4.

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a

decision '"[i]t is not [the] prerogative [of the court] to weigh the evidence anew." Id.,

~

5

( quoting Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P .2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App.
1995)). Rather, the court "must simply determine, in light of the evidence before the
[decision making body], whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion."
~

Id. Likewise, given the nature of judicial review of a decision making body's decision
"[i]t is incumbent upon the party challenging the . . . decision to marshal all of the
evidence in support thereof and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the . . . decision [is] not supported by substantial
evidence." Id. A party cannot simply argue facts that support its position and ignore the
facts that support the administrative decision. Id.,

~

7.

\

The City denied CBS's section 511 application because it furthered the City's goal
of reducing the total number of billboards within City limits.

CBS demolished its

billboard before it submitted its section 511 application because the land lease had
expired and the landlord had evicted the billboard from the property. See supra 7-8, § B,
Statement of Facts. Thus, denial of the request to relocate the billboard results in the
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reduction of the total number of billboards in the City. CBS contends the decision was
arbitrary and capricious because the Becker administration did not have a policy, practice
or goal of reducing the number of billboards within City limits and a policy, practice or
goal of an administration must be in writing and enacted by the City Council to be valid.
First, CBS has completely failed to satisfy its burden and marshal the evidence
that supports a finding that the Becker administration had a policy, practice or goal of
retiring billboards. Instead, CBS simply argues no such policy exists.
Second, a proper marshalling of the evidence reveals that the record is replete with
documents that illustrate the City's policy, practice, and goal of reducing billboards in the
City limits. These documents i~clude (1) the City's Billboard Ordinance;

15

(2) the 2011

proposal by the Becker administration to amend the Billboard Ordinance; 16 (3) Mayor

15

The City's Billboard Ordinance states its purpose is to limit the number of
billboards to the current number. Salt Lake City Code § 2 lA.46~ 160(A). It also sets up a
process for "banking" billboard credits in certain circumstances. Salt Lake City Code §§
21A.46.160(D)-(H). The billboard banking system permits a billboard owner to "bank
credits" if the billboard owner demolishes a billboard that is located in a "gateway" (or
other restricted area). Salt Lake City Code §§ 21A.46. l 60(D)-(H). Billboard credits may
be used to construct a new billboard in a non-gateway area, if they are used within three
years of the date of creation. Salt Lake City Code§§ 21A.46.160(G)&(N). The billboard
banking system has the effect of reducing the number of billboards in "gateways." It also
has the effect of reducing the total number of billboards in the City because a billboard
owner is not always able to find a new location and redeem the credits before they expire.
16
In 2011 the Becker administration proposed an amendment to the City's
Billboard Ordinance to amend the "purpose statement" to read as follows: "This chapter
is intended to limit and reduce the maximum number of billboards in Salt Lake City."
(R. 0746, SLCC 001572-77.) That amendment was proposed to "update current
regulations for outdoor billboards to make them consistent with State law." (R. 0746,
SLCC 001572-73 ). That amendment was not passed because the billboard ordinance
revisions also included revisions to the City's electronic billboard restrictions and the
City Council declined to consider the changes.
36
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Becker's 2013 State of the City address; 17 (4) the Declaration of Mayor Becker; 18 (5) the
City's history of denying other applications to relocate billboards and electing to pay just
compensation for that denial; 19 and (6) agreements the City has entered into with property
owners to limit the ability to place billboards on their properties. 20 The hearing officer
and the district court considered this evidence and found that there was substantial
evidence to show the Becker administration had a long-standing policy, practice or goal
of reducing the number of billboards within City limits.
Third, a policy, practice or goal of an administration does not need to be in writing
~

and enacted by the City Council to be valid. In its letter denying CBS 's application, the
City stated it was not willing to waive its ordinances and permit the relocation because
"the City has a long standing policy in favor of retiring and removing billboards." (R.
0746, 01542.)

CBS myopically focuses on the City's use of the word "policy" and

claims that there is no "policy" of reducing billboards in the City limits because the
17

In Mayor Becker's 2013 State of the City address, Mayor Becker repeated his
administration's policy and practice of reducing the number of billboards. (R. 07 46,
SLCC 001539, ~ 7).
18
Mayor Becker submitted a declaration referencing the "City's longstanding
policy to reduce the total number of billboards within the City" and stated that the
decisions on the applications CBS appeals were made pursuant to that policy. (R. 07 46,
SLCC 001539, ~ 7). It is well-known that the Becker administration was consistently in
favor of reducing the number of billboards in the City and CBS received ample evidence
of the Becker administration putting that position into practice by denying billboard
relocation applications on gateway streets whenever the opportunity to do so arose. (R.
0746, SLCC 001568-69).
19
The City has a history of denying applications to relocate and retiring billboards
when the opportunity arises, even when it results in protracted litigation. See e.g., Salt
Lake City v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, et. al. District Court Case No. 100910552,
Appellate Case No. 2015-0608-CA.
20
The City has entered into agreements with property owners to limit the ability
to place billboards on that property in the future. (R. 0746, SLCC 001589-1622).
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administration does not have authority to make policy. In its ordinary use, and the use
intended by counsel when writing this letter, the word "policy" includes common
practices and stated objectives and goals of an administration.

Clearly, the

administration, as the executive branch of the municipal government, has the authority to
set forth its objectives and goals for the City and direct the executive and administrative
departments of the City to act to further that vision.

See e.g., Utah Code § 10-3b-

202(l)(b) (stating the administration "exercises the executive and administrative powers
and performs or supervises the performance of the executive and administrative duties
and functions of the municipality"); Utah Code § 10-3b-202( 1)( d)(v) (stating the
administration may "exercise control of and supervise each executive or administrative
department, division, or officer of the municipality").

For example, decreasing

homelessness, improving public transportation, rejuvenating downtown, and improving
walkability and bikeability are all administrative policies, objectives and goals. These
policies, objectives and goals instruct the decisions and actions of an administration and
its departments and formal legislation passed by Council is not required to legitimize
those policies, objectives and goals.

In this case, the Becker administration had a

consistent policy, objective and goal to reduce the number of billboards in the City, and
the administration acted to further that goal when it denied CBS' s section 511
application.
Finally, the Court should disregard CBS_'s claim that the Becker administration's
policy, practice, or goal of reducing billboards in the City limits was contrary to the
City's Billboard Ordinance. A "cap and replace" system is not inconsistent with reducing
38
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the number of billboards in the City limits and the billboard banking system established
by the Billboard Ordinance operates in practice to reduce the number of billboards in the
City limits. See supra n.15. Likewise, there are myriad reasons the 2011 amendments to
~

the Billboard Ordinance were not adopted, which are outside the scope of the record of
this case. Regardless, the City Council's failure to adopt the amended ordinance does not
show the Becker administration had no policy, practice, or goal of reducing the number
of billboards in the City limits and does not show the Mayor could not act to further that
goal where the law gave him authority to do so, as it does in this case. The decision to

~

deny CBS' s section 511 application to further the City's goal of reducing the number of
billboards in the City limits was not arbitrary and capricious.

III.

THE CITY'S APPROVAL OF CORNER PROPERTY'S APPLICATION
WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL.
A.

The City Can Waive its Ordinances to Permit Relocation of Corner
Property's Billboard.

CBS does not dispute the Mayor has authority to approve Comer Property's
section 511 application, but contends the approval was illegal because section 511 does
not permit a City to waive ordinances that regulate the height of billboards. The rules of
statutory construction previously discussed also apply here.

See supra § II, A.2.i-v

( directing courts to look to the plain language of statutes and not to construe statutes to
give rise to absurd results.)
As established by the briefing in this matter, section 511 allows a City to waive (or
not waive) its zoning ordinances to permit relocation of a billboard. It is apparent from
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the plain language of section 511 that section 511 does not limit relocation applications to
requests for relocation within a certain distance, relocation of billboards of a certain
height, or relocation of a billboard with the same square footage or the same number of
Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c).

faces.

Rather, a billboard owner may submit an

application pursuant to section 511 that requests any relocation it desires. Utah Code

§ 10-9a-511 (3 )( c). This does not mean that the municipality will agree to waive its
ordinances and grant that application, but no form of application is specifically precluded.
Moreover, as a practical matter, section 511 necessarily must contemplate waiver
of ordinances relating to the height of the relocated billboard. Section 511 allows the
City to waive its zoning ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard to a "mutually
acceptable" location. Relocation is not going to be "mutually acceptable" if the billboard
is not visible at the new location. In this case, the proposed relocation was to the site of
CBS's now demolished billboard. In 2003, CBS's predecessor successfully argued that
the height of any billboard at that location needs to be 85 feet to be visible. 21 Indeed,
before pursuing relocation of its billboard under section 511, CBS submitted an
application un~er Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 and attempted to persuade the court that a
billboard at this location needed to be 116 feet tall to be visible. (R. 0746, SLCC 001428-

21

Specifically, in April, 2003, the prior owner of CBS 's billboard applied for and
received .permission from the City under a different provision of Utah Code to raise the
height of the billboard at that location. (R. 0746, SLCC 001422-26). The provision of
the code the prior owner applied under permits a billboard owner to raise the height of a
billboard if the "view and readability" is obstructed by certain improvements to an
interstate highway. Utah Code § 72-7-510.5. CBS's predecessor was granted a permit
and allowed to increase the height of its billboard to 85 feet because the new highway
walls obstructed the "view and readability" of the billboard.
40
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31 ).

22

Because a billboard needs to stand at 85 feet to be visible at the 726 West South

Temple location, the City waived its ordinances that would limit the billboard to 60 feet.

It is absurd for CBS to argue that the City's approval of Comer Property's application is
@

illegal because the City cannot waive its ordinances to allow the billboard to stand at the
same height as previous billboard companies argued was necessary to be visible at that
location.
Finally, it was not illegal for the City to grant Corner Property a permit to
construct a billboard with two faces because Comer Property's 500 South billboard had

<@

two faces. 23 CBS has not shown the City's approval of Corner Property's section 511
application violated any law, statute or ordinance and the decision was not illegal.

22

That application was denied because CBS was attempting to both move the
billboard and raise the height, which is not permitted by that provision of the code. (R.
0746, SLCC 001433-36). Notably, CBS argued to the district court that this prior attempt
to move and raise its billboard showed the City may not waive zoning requirements
relating to height in an application to relocate a billboard. Unlike section 511, Utah Code
§ 72-7-510.5 provides two distinct options to restore the view and readability of a
billboard that is obstructed by UDOT improvements: one, move the billboard within 500
feet of its original location or two, raise the height of the billboard in its current location.
Utah Code § 72-7-510.5. In contrast, section 511 does not identify specific options
available to a billboard owner or the City with respect to relocation of a billboard under
section 511. Rather, section 511 contemplates a negotiation and a waiver of zoning
ordinances to permit relocation to a "mutually acceptable" location. Utah Code § 10-9a5 l 1 (3 )( c)(i). Perhaps conceding that this reference is unhelpful, as the City argued to the
district court, CBS does not raise this point in this appeal.
23
CBS's assertion relies on the claim that the 500 South billboard "has been
pennitted by the City and by UDOT for only one face." (Appellant Br. 27.) As the City
explained to the hearing officer, the City was unable to locate a copy of the original
permit issued by the City because the permit was issued at least two decades ago.
(R. 07 46, SLCC 001415.) However, location of the permit is of little assistance because
prior to April 12, 1995, billboards were regulated by location and separation
requirements, not by a "billboard banking" method that keeps track of the number of
billboards and number of faces. (R. 0746, SLCC 001415.) Thus, Comer Property's
41
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B.

The City's Approval of Corner Property's Application is Supported by
Substantial Evidence.

The approval of Corner Property's application (and denial of CBS's application)
was not arbitrary and capricious because those decisions resulted in the removal of a
billboard from 500 South, a critical "gateway" into the City, and reduced the total number
of billboards in the City by one. See supra § II, C (showing a decision is not arbitrary or
capricious if it is supported by substantial evidence).

Specifically, the City agreed to

waive its ordinance and approve Corner Property's application because Corner Property
entered into a billboard relocation agreement under which Corner Property agreed to
remove a billboard on 500 South, a critical gateway into the City, if the City granted it a
permit to construct a billboard at 726 West South Temple.

As articulated at the

December 14, 2015 public hearing by a former employee of Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, notably a party with no property interest in the outcome of this hearing, the
opportunity to retire Comer Property's 500 South billboard was especially valuable to the
City because Corner Property owns the property on which its 500 South billboard stands.

initial permit from the City would not include the number of faces or permitted square
footage. (R. 0746, SLCC 001415.) Similarly, as explained by Corner Property, UDOT
only requires permitting for billboards that face the flow of traffic and 500 South is a one
way street. (R. 0746, SLCC 001415, 001421 & 001829-30.)
Moreover, apparent "illegality" or lack of proper permitting of a billboard does not
preclude relocation of a billboard. The. billboard industry lobbied the legislature· for
statutory provisions that would require the payment of just compensation under sect.ion
513 in circumstances where a billboard was not properly permitted or was othenvise
"illegal." See e.g., Utah Code § 10-9a-513(a)-(d) (excusing requirement to pay just
compensation under section 513(2) only where it can be shown by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the applicant made a "false and misleading" statement in the application
for a permit); Utah Code§ 10-9a-513(2)(c) (same).
42
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(R. 07 46~ SLCC 002234, 3 5: 1070-3 7: 1150.) When a billboard owner owns the property

on which the billboard stands, it is very unlikely the billboard will ever be retired as there
is no lease that will eventually expire.
@

Id.

Moreover, 500 South is a particularly

important gateway street for the City because it provides access into the City from the
highway. Id. Comer Property's billboard \Vas the only remaining billboard on 500 South
from 300 West to 700 East. Id. (R. 0746, SLCC 002305.)
In addition to removing a billboard from 500 South, granting Corner Property's
application and denying CBS's application resulted in the reduction of the total number
of billboards in the City limits by one.
CBS has argued previously that the City could have denied both applications and
reduced the total number of billboards in the City by two. That is not correct. Removal
of the 500 South billboard was contingent on granting Comer Property's application to
move to the 726 West South Temple location. Denial of both applications still results in
the net reduction of one billboard. The City made the decision that reducing the number
of billboards on 500 South was more important than reducing the number of billboards on
I-15. This preference for the removal of billboard from 500 South does not need to be in
writing and enacted by the City Council to be a legitimate reason to grant Corner
Property's application over CBS's application.

24

See supra 36-37, § II, C.

Unlike Corner Property, CBS offered no inducement for the City to exercise its
discretion to waive its ordinance with respect to CBS's application. To the contrary, CBS
24

CBS is well aware that beautifying 500 South and 600 South, which includes
relocation of billboards away from those gateways streets, is an ongoing discussion in the
City and Salt Lake County that is referred to as the "Grand Boulevard" project.
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had already demolished the billboard it now seeks to relocate because the land lease
expired and the property owner evicted CBS from the property.

Indeed, such a

circumstance presents exactly the opposite incentive, since it provides an opportunity for
the City to retire a billboard at a relatively low cost to the City.
Curiously, CBS argues that the City's approval of Comer Property's application
was arbitrary and capricious because Corner Property's billboard remains on 500 South.
(Appellant Br. 29, n.2.)

Simply driving down 500 South confirms that statement is

incorrect.
The City's approval of Corner Property's application (and the denial of CBS's
application) was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the City's decisions to deny CBS 's application and to
approve Corner Property's application because those decisions do not violate any law,
statute or ordinance and are not illegal. Likewise, CBS has not marshaled the evidence
that supports the City's decisions and that evidence shows the City's decisions were
supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary and capricious. Finally, even if
this Court found the approval of City Council was necessary to deny CB S's application,
CBS's remedy is a remand of that decision for the City to obtain that approval, not a
decision granting CBS a permit and revoking Corner Property's permit, as CBS requests.
y\-

DATED this ti_ day of August, 2016.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Salt Lake City Corporation
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§ 10-9a-511. Nonconforming uses and noncomplying structures, UT ST§ 10-9a-511

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use. Development. and Management Act {Refs & Annos)
Part 5. Land Use Ordinances
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-511
§ 10-9a-511. Nonconforming uses and noncomplying structures

Currentness
(I )(a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or noncomplying structure may be continued by the
present or a future property owner.

(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, provided no structural alteration of the building
is proposed or made for the purpose of the extension.

(c) For purposes of this Subsection (I), the addition of a solar energy device to a building is not a structural alteration.

(2) The legislative body may provide for:

(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming
uses upon the terms and conditions set forth in the land use ordinance;

(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by providing a formula establishing a reasonable
time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the nonconforming use,
if any; and

(c) the termination of a nonconforming use due to its abandonment.

(3)(a) A municipality may not prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a noncomplying structure or terminate the
nonconforming use of a structure that is involuntarily destroyed in whole or in part due to fire or other calamity unless
the structure or use has been abandoned.

(b) A municipality may prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a noncomplying structure or terminate the
nonconforming use of a structure if:

(i) the structure is allowed to deteriorate to a condition that the structure is rendered uninhabitable and is not
repaired or restored within six months after written notice to the property owner that the structure is uninhabitable
and that the noncomplying structure or nonconforming use will be lost if the structure is not repaired or restored
within six months; or

\":''._ '-: 1 ,:: •. •

@
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§ 10-9a-511. Nonconforming uses and noncomplying structures, UT ST § 10-9a-511

(ii) the property owner has voluntarily demolished a majority of the noncomplying structure or the building that
houses the nonconforming use.

(c)(i) Notwithstanding a prohibition in its zoning ordinance, a municipality may permit a billboard owner to relocate
the billboard within the municipality's boundaries to a location that is mutually acceptable to the municipality and
the billboard owner.

(ii) If the municipality and billboard owner cannot agree to a mutually acceptable location within 90 days after the
owner submits a written request to relocate the billboard, the provisions of Subsection I 0-9a-5 l 3(2)(a)(iv) apply.

(4)(a) Unless the municipality establishes, by ordinance, a uniform presumption of legal existence for nonconforming
uses, the property owner shall have the burden of establishing the legal existence of a noncomplying structure or
nonconforming use.

Qj)

(b) Any party claiming that a nonconforming use has been abandoned shall have the burden of establishing the
abandonment.

(c) Abandonment may be presumed to have occurred if:

(i) a majority of the primary structure associated with the nonconforming use has been voluntarily demolished
without prior written agreement with the municipality regarding an extension of the nonconforming use;

(ii) the use has been discontinued for a minimum of one year; or

(iii) the primary structure associated with the nonconforming use remains vacant for a period of one year.

I.@

(d) The property owner may rebut the presumption of abandonment under Subsection (4)(c), and shall have the burden
of establishing that any claimed abandonment under Subsection (4)(b) has not in fact occurred.

(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of a school district or charter school use or structure when
the property associated with the school district or charter school use or structure ceases to be used for school district or
charter school purposes for a period established by ordinance.

Credits
Laws 2005, c. 254, § 40, eff. May 2. 2005; Laws 2007. c. 171. § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 170, § 1. eff. May 12,
2009; Laws 2010, c. 394, § I, eff. May 11,2010: Laws 2011, c. 210. § I, eff. May 10, 2011: Laws 2012. c. 289. § 4. eff. May
8. 2012; Laws 2015. c. 205. § l. eff. May 12. 2015.
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent..., UT ST§ 10-9a-513

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use, Development. and Management Act {Refs & Annos)
Part 5. Land Use Ordinances
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-513
§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent domain--Removal

without providing compensation--Limit on allowing nonconforming billboards to
be rebuilt or replaced--Validity of municipal permit after issuance of state permit
Currentness
(I) As used in this section:

(a) "Clearly visible" means capable of being read without obstruction by an occupant of a vehicle traveling on a street
or highway within the visibility area.

(b) "Highest allowable height" means:

(i) if the height allowed by the municipality, by ordinance or consent, is higher than the height under Subsection
(l)(b)(ii), the height allowed by the municipality; or

(ii)(A) for a noninterstate billboard:

(I) if the height of the previous use or structure is 45 feet or higher, the height of the previous use or structure; or

{II) if the height of the previous use or structure is less than 45 feet, the height of the previous use or structure
or the height to make the entire advertising content of the billboard clearly visible, whichever is higher, but
no higher than 45 feet; and

(B) for an interstate billboard:

(I) if the height of the previous use or structure is at or above the interstate height, the height of the previous

use or structure; or

(II) if the height of the previous use or structure is less than the interstate height, the height of the previous use
or structure or the height to make the entire advertising content of the billboard clearly visible, whichever is
higher, but no higher than the interstate height.

(c) "Interstate billboard" means a billboard that is intended to be viewed from a highway that is an interstate.
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent... , UT ST§ 10-9a-513

(d) "Interstate height" means a height that is the higher of:

(i) 65 feet above the ground; and

(ii) 25 feet above the grade of the interstate.

(e) "Noninterstate billboard" means a billboard that is intended to be viewed from a street or highway that is not
an interstate.

(f) "Visibility area" means the area on a street or highway that is:

(i) defined at one end by a line extending from the base of the billboard across all Janes of traffic of the street or
highway in a plane that is perpendicular to the street or highway; and

(ii) defined on the other end by a line extending across all lanes of traffic of the street or highway in a plane that is:

(A) perpendicular to the street or highway; and

(B)(I) for an interstate billboard, 500 feet from the base of the billboard; or

(II) for a noninterstate billboard, 300 feet from the base of the billboard.

(2)(a) A municipality is considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent domain if the
municipality prevents a billboard owner from:

(i) rebuilding, maintaining, repairing, or restoring a billboard structure that is damaged by casualty, an act of God,
or vandalism;

(ii) except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), relocating or rebuilding a billboard structure, or taking other measures,
to correct a mistake in the placement or erection of a billboard for which the municipality has issued a permit, if the
proposed relocation, rebuilding, or other measure is consistent with the intent of that permit;

(iii) structura11y modifying or upgrading a billboard;

(iv) relocating a billboard into any commercial, industrial, or manufacturing zone within the municipality's
boundaries, if:
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent..., UT ST§ 10-9a-513

(A) the relocated billboard is:

(I) within 5,280 feet of its previous location; and

(II) no closer than:

(Aa) 300 feet from an off-premise sign existing on the same side of the street or highway; or

(Bb) if the street or highway is an interstate or limited access highway that is subject to Title 72, Chapter 7,
Part 5, Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, the distance allowed under that act between the relocated bi11board
and an off-premise sign existing on the same side of the interstate or limited access highway; and

(B)(I) the bi11board owner has submitted a written request under Subsection 10-9a-5l 1(3)(c); and

(II) the municipality and billboard owner are unable to agree, within the time provided in Subsection
10-9a-511 (3)(c), to a mutual1y acceptable location; or

(v) making the following modifications, as the billboard owner determines, to a billboard that is structurally
modified or upgraded under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) or relocated under Subsection (2)(a)(iv):

(A) erecting the billboard:

(I) to the highest allowable height; and

(II) as the owner determines, to an angle that makes the entire advertising content of the billboard clearly
visible; and

(B) installing a sign face on the billboard that is at least the same size as, but no larger than, the sign face on the
billboard before its relocation.

(b) A modification under Subsection (2)(a)(v) shall comply with Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5, Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act, to the extent applicable.

(c) A municipality's denial of a billboard owner's request to relocate or rebuild a billboard structure, or to take other
measures, in order to correct a mistake in the placement or erection of a billboard does not constitute the initiation
of acquisition by eminent domain under Subsection (2)(a) if the mistake in placement or erection of the billboard is
determined by clear and convincing evidence to have resulted from an intentionally false or misleading statement:
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent. .. , UT ST§ 10-9a-513

(i) by the billboard applicant in the application; and

(ii) regarding the placement or erection of the billboard.

(d) If a municipality is considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent domain under
Subsection (2)(a) orany other provision ofapplicable law, the municipality shall pay just compensation to the billboard
owner in an amount that is:

(i) the value of the existing billboard at a fair market capitalization rate, based on actual annual revenue, less any
annual rent expense;

(ii) the value of any other right associated with the billboard structure that is acquired;

(iii) the cost of the sign structure; and

(iv) damage to the economic unit described in Subsection 72-7-510(3 )(b ), of which the billboard owner's interest
is a part.

(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) and Section l0-9a-512, a municipality may remove a billboard without providing
compensation if:

(a) the municipality determines:

(i) by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading statement
in the applicant's application regarding the placement or erection of the billboard; or

(ii) by substantial evidence that the billboard:

(A) is structurally unsafe;

(B) is in an unreasonable state of repair; or

(C) has been abandoned for at least 12 months;

(b) the municipality notifies the owner in writing that the owner's billboard meets one or more of the conditions listed
in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (ii);

(c) the owner fails to remedy the condition or conditions within:
Digitized byReuters.
the Howard
Hunter
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
,· 1: _) ;-;, / '.'.' © 2016 Thomson
NoW.
claim
to Law
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent..., UT ST § 10-9a-513

(i) except as provided in Subsection (3){c)(ii), 90 days following the billboard owner's receipt of written notice under
Subsection (3)(b); or

(ii) if the condition forming the basis of the municipality's intention to remove the billboard is that it is structurally
unsafe, 10 business days, or a longer period if necessary because of a natural disaster, following the billboard owner's
receipt of written notice under Subsection (3)(b); and

(d) following the expiration of the applicable period under Subsection (3 )(c) and after providing the owner with
reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the municipality finds:

(i) by clear and convincing evidence, that the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading
statement in the application regarding the placement or erection of the billboard; or

(ii) by substantial evidence that the billboard is structurally unsafe, is in an unreasonable state of repair, or has been
abandoned for at least 12 months.

(4) A municipality may not allow a nonconforming billboard to be rebuilt or replaced by anyone other than its owner
or the owner acting through its contractors.

(5) A pem1it issued. extended. or renewed by a municipality for a billboard remains valid from the time the municipality
issues, extends, or rene\vs the permit until 180 days after a required state permit is issued for the billboard if:

(a) the bil1board requires a state permit; and

(b) an application for the state permit is filed within 30 days after the municipality issues, extends, or renews a permit
for the billboard.

Credits
Laws 2005. c. 254, § 42, eff. May 2, 2005: Laws 2007. c. 171. § 2, eff. April 30. 2007: Laws 2009. c. 170. § 2, eff. May 12.
2009; Laws 2009. c. 233. § 1. eff. Mav 12, 2009.
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§ 10-9a-7O1. Appeal authority required--Condition precedent to ... , UT ST§ 10-9a-701

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use. Development. and Management Act {Refs & Annos)
Part 7. Appeal Authority and Variances
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-701
§ 10-9a-701. Appeal authority required--Condition precedent to judicial review--Appeal authority duties

Currentness
( 1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one or more appeal authorities to
hear and decide:

(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances;

(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances; and

(c) appeals from a fee charged in accordance with Section l0-9a-510.

(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall timely and specifically challenge a
land use authority's decision, in accordance with local ordinance.

~

(3) An appeal authority:

(a) shall:

(i) act in a quasi-judicial manner; and

(ii) serve as the final arbiter of issues involving the interpretation or application of land use ordinances; and

(b) may not entertain an appeal of a matter in which the appeal authority, or any participating member, had first
acted as the land use authority.

(4) By ordinance, a municipality may:

(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than the appeal authority it designates to hear
appeals;

.-',, ,, : l,. ·, -
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§ 10-9a-701. Appeal authority required--Condition precedent to ... , UT ST§ 10-9a-701

(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types of appeals of land use authority decisions;

(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district
court;

(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive appeals before the same or separate appeal
authorities as a condition of the adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative remedies; and

(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed directly to the district court.

(5) If the municipality establishes or, prior to the effective date of this chapter, has established a multiperson board,
body, or panel to act as an appeal authority, at a minimum the board, body, or panel shall:

(a) notify each of its members of any meeting or hearing of the board, body, or panel;

(b) provide each of its members with the same information and access to municipal resources as any other member;

(c) convene only if a quorum of its members is present; and

(d) act only upon the vote of a majority of its convened members.

~
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Laws 2005. c. 254, § 61, eff. May 2, 2005;_ Laws 2011. c. 92. § 4, eff. Mav 10.2011.
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§ 10-9a-707. Standard of review for appeals, UT ST§ 10-9a-707

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 7. Appeal Authority and Variances
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-707
§ 10-9a-707. Standard of review for appeals

Currentness
(l) A municipality may, by ordinance, designate the standard of review for appeals of land use authority decisions.

(2) If the municipality fails to designate a standard of review of factual matters, the appeal authority shall review the

matter de novo.

(3) The appeal authority shall determine the correctness of a decision of the land use authority in its interpretation and
application of a land use ordinance.

(4) Only those decisions in which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person,
or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority.

Credits
Laws 2005. c. 254. § 67, eff. May 2, 2005.

U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-707, UT ST§ 10-9a-707
Current through 2016 Third Special Session
End of Document
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Chapter 21A.16
APPEALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
This section has been affected by a recently passed ordinance, 10-2016 - LAND USE
PROVISIONS . Go to new ordinance.

21A.16.010: AUTHORITY:
~

As described in section 21A.06.040 of this title, the appeals hearing officer shall hear and
decide appeals alleging an error in any administrative decision made by the zoning
administrator or the administrative hearing officer in the administration or enforcement of this
title, as well as administrative decisions of the historic landmark commission; and the
planning commission.

<;j

In addition, the appeals hearing officer shall hear and decide applications for variances as
per chapter 21A.18 of this title. (Ord. 61-12, 2012)

@

21A.16.020: PARTIES ENTITLED TO APPEAL:
An applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision administering or
interpreting this title may appeal to the appeals hearing officer. (Ord. 31-12, 2012)

This section has been affected by a recently passed ordinance, 10-2016 - LAND USE
PROVISIONS . Go to new ordinance.

21A.16.030: PROCEDURE:
Appeals of administrative decisions by the zoning administrator, historic landmark
commission or planning c.ommission to the appeals hearing officer shall be taken in
accordance with the following procedures:

A. Filing Of Appeal: An appeal shall be made in writing within ten (10) days of the
administrative decision by the zoning administrator, historic landmark commission or
planning commission and shall be filed with the zoning administrator. The appeal shall
specify the decision appealed, the alleged error made in connection with the decision
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being appealed, and the reasons the appellant claims the decision to be in error.
including every theory of relief that can be presented in district court.

B. Fees: The application shall be accompanied by the applicable fees shown on the Salt
Lake City consolidated fee schedule. The applicant shall also be responsible for payment
of all fees established for providing the public notice required by chapter 21A.10 of this
title.

C. Stay Of Proceedings: An appeal to the appeals hearing officer shall stay all further
proceedings concerning the matter about which the appealed order, requirement.
decision, determination, or interpretation was made unless the zoning administrator
certifies in writing to the appeals hearing officer, after the appeal has been filed, that a
stay would, in the zoning administrator's opinion. be against the best interest of the city.

D. Notice Required:
1. Public Hearing: Upon receipt of an appeal of an administrative decision by the zoning
administrator, the appeals hearing officer shall schedule and hold a public hearing in
accordance with the standards and procedures for conduct of the public hearing set
forth in chapter 21A.10 of this title.
2. Notice Of Appeals Of Administrative Decisions Of The Historic Landmark Commission
Or Planning Commission: Appeals from a decision of the historic landmark commission
or planning commission are based on evidence in the record. Therefore, testimony at
the appeal meeting shall be limited to the appellant and the respondent.

\

a. Upon receipt of an appeal of a decision by the historic landmark commission or
planning commission the appeals hearing officer shall schedule a public meeting to
hear arguments by the appellant and respondent. Notification of the date, time and
place of the meeting shall be given to the appellant and respondent a minimum of
twelve (12) calendar days in advance of the meeting.
b. The city shall give e-mail notification, or other form of notification chosen by the
appeals hearing officer, a minimum of twelve (12) calendar days in advance of the
hearing to any organization entitled to receive notice pursuant to title 2, chapter 2.60
of this code.

E. Standard Of Review:
1. The standard of review for an appeal, other than as provided in subsection E2 of this
section, shall be de novo. The appeals hearing officer shall review the matter appealed
anew. based upon applicable procedures and standards for approval. and shall give no
deference to the decision below.
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2. An appeal from a decision of the historic landmark commission or planning
commission shall be based on the record made below.
a. No new evidence shall be heard by the appeals hearing officer unless such
evidence was improperly excluded from consideration below.
b. The appeals hearing officer shall review the decision based upon applicable
standards and shall determine its correctness.
c. The appeals hearing officer shall uphold the decision unless it is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record or it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect
when the decision was made.

F. Burden Of Proof: The appellant has the burden of proving the decision appealed is
incorrect.

G. Action By The Appeals Hearing Officer: The appeals hearing officer shall render a written
decision on the appeal. Such decision may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or may
modify the administrative decision. A decision by the appeals hearing officer shall
become effective on the date the decision is rendered.

H. Notification Of Decision: Notification of the decision of the appeals hearing officer shall be
sent by mail to all parties to the appeal within ten (10) days of the appeals hearing
officer's decision.

I. Record Of Proceedings: The proceedings of each appeal hearing shall be recorded on
audio equipment. The audio recording of each appeal hearing shall be kept for a
minimum of sixty (60) days. Upon the written request of any interested person, such
audio recording shall be kept for a reasonable period of time beyond the sixty (60) day
period, as determined by the appeals hearing officer. Copies of the tapes of such
hearings may be provided, if requested, at the expense of the requesting party. The
appeals hearing officer may have the appeal proceedings contemporaneously
transcribed by a court reporter.

J. Appeals: Any person adversely affected by a final decision made by the appeals hearing
officer may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within thirty (30)
days after the decision is rendered.
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K. Policies And Procedures: The planning director shall adopt policies and procedures,
consistent with the provisions of this section, for processing appeals, the conduct of an
appeal hearing. and for any other purpose considered necessary to properly consider an
appeal. (Ord. 54-14, 2014: Ord. 58-13, 2013: Ord. 61-12, 2012)

21A.16.040: APPEAL OF DECISION:
Any person adversely affected by a final decision made by the appeals hearing officer may
file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within thirty (30) days after the
decision is rendered. (Ord. 8-12, 2012)

21A.16.050: STAY OF DECISION:
The appeals hearing officer may stay the issuance of any permits or approvals based on its
decision for thirty (30) days or until the decision of the district court in any appeal of the
decision. (Ord. 8-12, 2012)
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21A.46.160: BILLBOARDS:~ c21
A. Purpose Statement: This section is intended to limit the maximum number of billboards in Salt
Lake City to no greater than the current number. This chapter further provides reasonable
processes and methods for the replacement or relocation of existing nonconforming billboards to
areas of the city where they will have less negative impact on the goals and policies of the city
which promote the enhancement of the city's gateways, views, vistas and related urban design
elements of the city's master plans.

B. Definitions: The definitions in this section apply in addition to those in section 21A.46.020 of this
chapter.
BILLBOARD: A form of an off premises sign. A freestanding ground sign located on industrial,
commercial or residential property if the sign is designed or intended to direct attention to a
business, product or service that is not sold, offered or existing on the property where the sign is
located.
BILLBOARD BANK: An accounting system established by the city to keep track of the number and
square footage of nonconforming billboards removed pursuant to this chapter.
BILLBOARD CREDIT: An entry into a billboard owner's billboard bank account that shows the
number and square footage of demolished nonconforming billboards.
BILLBOARD OWNER: The owner of a billboard in Salt Lake City.
DWELL TIME: The length of time that elapses between text, images, or graphics on an electronic
billboard or electronic sign.
ELECTRONIC BILLBOARD: Any off premises sign, video display, projected image, or similar device
with text, images, or graphics generated by solid state electronic components. Electronic billboards
include, but are not limited to, billboards that use light emitting diodes (LED), plasma displays, fiber
optics, or other technology that results in bright, high resolution text, images, and graphics.
ELECTRONIC SIGN: Any on premises sign, video display, projected image, or similar device with
text, images, or graphics generated by solid state electronic components. Electronic signs include,
but are not limited to, signs that use light emitting diodes (LED), plasma displays, fiber optics, or
other technology that results in bright, high resolution text, images, and graphics.

,_;,;,,
VJV

EXISTING BILLBOARD: A billboard which was constructed, maintained and in use or for which a
permit for construction was issued as of July 13, 1993.
FOOT-CANDLE: The English unit of measurement for luminance, which is equal to one lumen,
incident upon an area of one square foot.
'.GATEWAY: The following streets ·or highways within Salt Lake City::

:1. Interstate 80;
2. lnterstate215~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. Interstate 15;

4. 4000 West;
5. 5600 West;

:6. 2100 South Street frdm Interstate 15 to 1300. East;:
7. The 2100 South Expressway from 1-15 west fo the city limit;;
8. Foothill Drive from Guardsman Way to Interstate

ao;:

9. 400 South from Interstate 15 to 800 East;

10. 500 South from Interstate 15 to 700 East;
,11. 600 South from Interstate 15 to 700 Ea.st;;
12. 300 West from 900 North to 900 South~
·13. North Temple from Main Street to Interstate 80~
14. Main Street from North Temple to 2100 So~th Stre~tj
15. State Stre.eftrom . Squth.Teniple
!16.

to 21Q0 South; ari~

aoo· North from ado West Jo 300 West.;

ILLUMINANCE: The intensity of light falling on a subsurface at a defined distance from the source.
MOTION: The depiction of movement or change of position of text. images, or graphics. Motion shall
include, but not be limited to, visual effects such as dissolving and fading text and images. running
sequential text, graphic bursts, lighting that resembles zooming, twinkling, or sparkling, changes in
light or color. transitory bursts of light intensity, moving patterns or bands of light, expanding or
contracting shapes. and similar actions.
NEW BILLBOARD: A billboard for which a permit to construct is issued after December 31, 1993.
NONCONFORMING BILLBOARD: An existing billboard which is located in a zoning district or
otherwise situated in a way which would not be permitted by the provisions of this chapter.
SPECIAL GATEWAY: The following streets or highways within Salt Lake City:

1. North Temple between 600 West and 2200 West;
2. 400 South between 200 East and 800 East;
3. State Street between 600 South and 2100 South; and
4. Main Street between 600 South and 2100 South.
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TEMPORARY EMBELLISHMENT: An extension of the billboard resulting in increased square
footage as part of an artistic design to convey a specific message or advertisement.
TWIRL Tl ME: The time it takes for static text, images, and graphics on an electronic billboard or
electronic sign to change to a different text, images, or graphics on a subsequent sign face.

C. Limit On The Total Number Of Billboards: No greater number of billboards shall be allowed in Salt
Lake City than the number of existing billboards.

D. Permit Required For Removal Of Nonconforming Billboards:
1. Permit: Nonconforming billboards may be removed by the billboard owner only after obtaining a
permit for the demolition of the nonconforming billboard.
2. Application: Application for demolition shall be on a form provided by the zoning administrator.
3. Fee: The fee for demolishing a nonconforming billboard shall be as shown on the Salt Lake City
consolidated fee schedule.

E. Credits For Nonconforming Billboard Removal: After a nonconforming billboard is demolished
pursuant to a permit issued under subsection 01 of this section, or its successor, the city shall
create a billboard bank account for the billboard owner. The account shall show the date of the
removal and the zoning district of the demolished nonconforming billboard. The account shall
reflect billboard credits for the billboard and its square footage. Demolition of a conforming
billboard shall not result in any billboard credit.

F. Priority For Removal Of Nonconforming Billboards: Nonconforming billboards shall be removed
subject to the following priority schedule:
1. Billboards in districts zoned residential, historic, residential R-MU or downtown D-1, 0-3 and 0-4
sh all be removed first;
2. Billboards in districts zoned commercial CN or CB, or gateway or on gateways shall be removed
second;
3. Billboards which are nonconforming for any other reason shall be removed last; and

~

4. A billboard owner may demolish nonconforming billboards of a lower priority before removing
billboards in a higher priority; however, the billboard credits for removing the lower priority billboard
shall not become effective for use in constructing a new billboard until two (2) billboards specified in
subsection F1 of this section, or its successor, with a total square footage equal to or greater than
the lower priority billboard, are credited in the billboard owner's billboard bank account. If a billboard
owner has no subsection F1 of this section, or its successor, nonconforming billboards, two (2)
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subsection F2 of this section, or its successor, priority billboards may be credited in the billboard
owner's billboard bank account to effectuate the billboard credits of a subsection F3 of this section,
or its successor, billboard to allow the construction of a new billboard. For the purposes of this
section, the two (2) higher priority billboards credited in the billboard bank account can be used only
once to effectuate the billboard credits for a lower priority billboard.

G. Life Of Billboard Credits: Any billboard credits not used within thirty six (36) months of their
creation shall expire and be of no further value or use except that lower priority credits
effectuated pursuant to subsection F4 of this section, or its successor, shall expire and be of no
further value or use within sixty (60) months of their initial creation.

H. Billboard Credits Transferable: A billboard owner may sell or otherwise transfer a billboard and/or
billboard credits. Transferred billboard credits which are not effective because of the priority
provisions of subsection F of this section, or its successor, shall not become effective for their
new owner until they would have become effective for the original owner. The transfer of any
billboard credits do not extend their thirty six (36) month life provided in subsection G of this
section, or its successor.

I. Double Faced Billboards: Demolition of a nonconforming billboard that has two (2) advertising
faces shall receive billboard credits for the square footage on each face, but only as one
billboard.

J. New Billboard Construction: It is unlawful to construct a new billboard other than pursuant to the
terms of this chapter. In the event of a conflict between this chapter and any other provision in
this code, the provisions of this chapter shall prevail.

K. Permitted Zoning Districts: New billboards may be constructed only in the area identified on the
official billboard map.

L. New Billboard Permits:

1. Application: Anyone desiring to construct a new billboard shall file an application on a form provided
by the zoning administrator.

2. Fees: The fees for a new billboard construction permit shall be:
a. Building permit and plan review fees required by the uniform building code as adopted by the city;
and
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b. Inspection tag fees as shown on the Salt Lake City consolidated fee schedule.

M. Use Of Billboard Credits:
1. A new billboard permit shall only be issued if the applicant has billboard credits of a sufficient
number of square feet and billboards to allow construction of the new billboard.
2. When the permit for the construction of a new billboard is issued, the zoning administrator shall
deduct from the billboard owner's billboard bank account:
a. The square footage of the new billboard; and
b. The number of billboards whose square footage was used to allow the new billboard construction.
3. If the new billboard uses less than the entire available billboard credits considering both the number
of billboards and square footage, any remaining square footage shall remain in the billboard bank.

as

N. New Billboards Prohibited On ·Gateways: Except
provided in'·sub~ection Q_ofthis ~ediop, ·or'it~
successor, no new billboard may· be constructed vyithin si.x _h~r,dr~tjJ¢.et'(69C)') of the. ri.ght of w_ay of;
any gateway.

0. Special Gateway Provisions:
1. If a nonconforming billboard is demolished within a special gateway, the billboard owner may
construct a new billboard along the same special gateway in a zoning district equal to or less
restrictive than that from which the nonconforming billboard was removed and subject to subsections
P, Q, Rand S of this section, provided that the size of the new billboard does not exceed the amount
of billboard credits in the special gateway billboard bank.
2. The demolition of a nonconforming billboard pursuant to this section shall not accrue billboard credits
within the general billboard bank. Credits for a billboard demolished or constructed within a special
gateway shall be tracked within a separate bank account for each special gateway. A permit for the
construction of a new billboard pursuant to this section must be taken out within thirty six (36)
months of the demolition of the nonconforming billboard.

P. Maximum Size: The maximum size of the advertising area of any new billboard shall not exceed
fifteen feet (15') in height and fifty feet (50') in width.

Q. Temporary Embellishments:
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1. Temporary embellishments shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the advertising face of any
billboard, and shall not exceed five feet (5 1) in height above the billboard structure.
2. No temporary embellishment shall be maintained on a billboard more than twelve ( 12) months.

R. Height: The highest poi_nt of any new billboard, excluding temporary embellishments shall not be
more than:
1. Forty five feet (45') above the existing grade; or
2. If a street within one hundred feet (100') of the billboard, measured from the street at the point at
which the billboard is perpendicular to the street, is on a different grade than the new billboard,
twenty five feet (25') above the pavement elevation of the street.
3. If the provisions of subsection R2 of this section, or its successor subsection, apply to more than one
street, the new billboard may be the higher of the two (2) heights.

S. Minimum Setback Requirements: All freestanding billboards shall be subject to pole sign setback
requirements listed for the district in which the billboard is located. In the absence of setback
standards for a particular district, freestanding billboards shall maintain a setback of not less than
five feet (5') from the front or corner side lot line. This setback requirement shall be applied to all
parts of the billboard, not just the sign support structure.

T. Spacing:
1. Small Signs: Billboards with an advertising face three hundred (300) square feet or less in size shall
not be located closer than three hundred (300) linear feet from any other small billboard or eight
hundred feet (800') from a large billboard on the same side of the street;
2. Large Signs: Billboards with an advertising face greater than three hundred (300) square feet in size
shall not be located closer than eight hundred (800) linear feet from any other billboard, small or
large, on the same side of the street.
3. Electronic Billboards: Electronic billboards shall not be located closer than one thousand six hundred
(1,600) linear feet from any other electronic billboard on the same or opposite side of the street.

U. Electronic Billboards:
1. Prohibitions: Except as provided in subsection U2 of this section, after the effective date of this
subsection U:
a. No electronic billboard shall be constructed or reconstructed for any reason, and
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b. The conversion, remodeling, or rehabilitation of any existing billboard to an electronic format is
prohibited.
2. Standards When Construction/Conversion Required By Law: If after the effective date of this
subsection U the city is required by law to allow construction of a new electronic billboard, or to allow
conversion of an existing billboard to an electronic format, any such electronic billboard shall be
operated pursuant to the following standards:
a. Any motion of any kind is prohibited on an electronic sign face. Electronic billboards shall have only
static text, images, and graphics.

~

(1) The dwell time of any text. image, or display on an electronic billboard may not exceed more than
once every eight (8) seconds. Twirl time between subsequent text, images, or display shall not
exceed one-fourth (0.25) second.
(2) The illumination of any electronic billboard shall not increase the ambient lighting level more than
three-tenths (0.3) foot-candle when measured by a foot-candle meter perpendicular to the electronic
billboard face at:
(A) One hundred fifty feet (150') for an electronic billboard with a surface area of not more than two
hundred forty two (242) square feet;
(8) Two hundred feet (200') for an electronic billboard with a surface area greater than two hundred
forty two (242) square feet but not more than three hundred seventy eight (378) square feet;
(C) Two hundred fifty feet (250') for an electronic billboard with a surface area greater than three
hundred seventy eight (378) square feet but not more than six hundred seventy two (672) square
feet; and
(D) Three hundred fifty feet (350') for an electronic billboard with a surface area greater than six
hundred seventy two (672) square feet.
b. Electronic billboards may not be illuminated or lit between the hours of twelve o'clock (12:00)
midnight and six o'clock (6:00) A.M. if they are located in, or within six hundred feet (600') of a
residential, mixed use, downtown, Sugar House business district, gateway, neighborhood
commercial, community business, or community shopping center zoning district.
c. Controls shall be provided as follows:
(1) All electronic billboards shall be equipped with an automatic dimmer control or other mechanism
that automatically controls the sign's brightness and display period as provided above.
(2) Prior to approval of any permit to operate an electronic billboard, the applicant shall certify that the
sign has been tested and complies with the motion, dwell time, brightness, and other requirements
herein.
(3) The owner and/or operator of an electronic billboard shall submit an annual report to the city
certifying that the sign complies with the motion, dwell time, brightness, and other requirements
herein.
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V. Landscaping In Residential And Commercial CN And CB Zoning Districts: Properties in any
residential zone and commercial CN or CB zones on which a billboard is the only structure shall
be landscaped as required by sections 21A.26.020 and 21A.26.030 and chapter 21A.48 of this
title, or its successor chapter. No portion of such property shall be hard or gravel surfaced.

W. Landscaping In Other Zoning Districts: Property in all districts other than as specified in
subsection V of this section, or its successor subsection, upon which a billboard is the only
structure, shall be landscaped from the front of the property to the deepest interior point of the
billboard for fifty (50) linear feet along the street frontage distributed, to the maximum extent
possible, evenly on each side of the billboard.

X. Xeriscape Alternative: If all the properties adjacent to and across any street from the property for
which billboard landscaping is required pursuant to subsection W of this section, or its successor
subsection, are not developed or, if a water line for irrigation does not exist on the property or in
the street right of way adjacent to such property, the zoning administrator may authorize
xeriscaping as an alternative for the required landscaping.

Y. Existing Billboard Landscaping: Existing billboards shall comply with the landscaping provisions of
this section on or before January 1, 1996.

Z. Compliance With Tree Stewardship Ordinance: Construction, demolition or maintenance of
billboards shall comply with the provisions of the Salt Lake City tree stewardship ordinance.
AA. Subdivision Registration: To the extent that the lease or other acquisition of land for the site of a
new billboard may be determined to be a subdivision pursuant to state statute no subdivision plat
shall be required and the zoning administrator is authorized to approve, make minor subsequent
amendments to, and record as necessary, such subdivision.
BB. Special Provisions:
1. Applicability: The provisions of this section shall apply to specified billboards located:
a. Four (4) existing billboards between 1500 North and 1800 North adjacent to the west side of
Interstate 15; and
b. One existing billboard on the east side of Victory Road at approximately 1100 North.
2. General Applicability: Except as modified by this section, all other provisions of this chapter shall
apply to the five (5) specified billboards.
3. Special Priority: The five (5) specified billboards shall be considered as gateway billboards for the
purposes of the priority provisions of subsection F of this section, or its successor subsection.
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4. Landscaping: The five (5) specified billboards shall be landscaped pursuant to the provisions of
subsection W of this section, or its successor subsection.

CC. State Mandated Relocation Of Billboards: Except as otherwise authorized herein, existing
billboards may not be relocated except as mandated by the requirements of Utah state law. (Ord.
4-12, 2012: Ord. 24-11, 2011)
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